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Towards an Education-based Meritocracy? 
Abstract 
Education is the single most important determinant
of life chances. Hence, reducing socioeconomic in-
equalities in education is a priority in promoting
equal opportunities. This article first discusses con-
cerning trends over time in inequalities of educa-
tional opportunity in western nations, arguing that
evidence indicates that while these inequalities have
declined in the post-war decades, they have stag-
nated for cohorts since the 1980s. Next, I argue that
this pattern contradicts the expectations of the two
dominant theories in the field: modernisation the-
ory and persistent inequality. Finally, I argue that
this empirical pattern is consistent with an institu-
tional explanation which pays more attention than
these theories do to the evolution of educational
policies, labour market arrangements and welfare
protection.
Keywords: educational inequality, inequality of
educational opportunity, persistent inequality, social
mobility, social origins, modernisation theory
1. Is capitalism conducive to an 
education-based meritocracy? 
A dispute between two theories  
Education is a key determinant of life chances which
is strongly affected by family socioeconomic back-
ground. Hence, education promotes the intergenera-
tional reproduction of privilege: this is an uncontested
sociological fact. What sociologists debate is whether
the Inequality of Educational Opportunity (IEO) de-
creases, increases or remains unchanged over time.
This is more than an empirical debate: it is a dispute
over the key drivers of social mobility in contempo-
rary societies and, more fundamentally, the wide-
spread belief that capitalist development promotes the
advent of an education-based meritocracy. In turn,
the supposed advent of meritocracy plays a major role
for the legitimation of the marked inequalities of con-
dition observed in capitalist societies, which would be
justified, to the extent that everyone is given the op-
portunity to reach the top.   
The dispute over the advent of education-based
meritocracies has been dominated by two main hy-
potheses: according to modernisation theories, capi-
talism development results in declining IEO, while
social reproduction theories predict the persistence of
IEO. The main thesis of this article is that neither of
these two families of theories fits the current empirical
evidence, and that we therefore need an alternative
interpretation of trends in IEO, which I sketch below.
Let me first quickly illustrate the two competitors
of the dispute. On one side, modernisation theory as-
sumes the optimistic view that economic develop-
ment is conducive to a diminished influence of
ascriptive factors on educational and occupational
success (Treiman, 1970; Bell, 1974; Ganzeboom et
al., 1991). Capitalist development brings widespread
economic affluence and stimulates growing public in-
vestments in education, which reduce economic hur-
dles to educational participation for the working class.
Moreover, modernisation promotes an upgrading of
the occupational structure which increases the 
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economic value of educational qualifications in indus-
trial and postindustrial societies, thus enhancing in-
centives to invest in education. Finally, modernisation
is supposed to promote the rise of universalistic and
meritocratic values which would inhibit discrimina-
tory practices in education and at the workplace. Cap-
italist societies would therefore increasingly approach
the ideal of an education-based meritocracy, where ac-
cess to education is unaffected by family background,
and where educational qualifications are a major de-
terminant of economic success. Hence, IEO is ex-
pected to decline linearly, or at least monotonically.
On the other side, according to social reproduc-
tion theories (Shavit, Yossi & Blossfeld, 1993; Collins,
1971; Bourdieu, 1979; Bourdieu & Passeron, 1977;
Goldthorpe, 2000), capitalist development does not
reduce IEO. While lower educational levels become
universally accessible, educational competition shifts
to higher educational levels, where the uppper classes
would preserve a strong competitive advantage. They
can mobilise their persistently higher cultural re-
sources to achieve better academic performance,
which is a major predictor of school success. They can
also mobilise their higher economic resources to sus-
tain the costs of longer educational durations in bet-
ter-quality schools and universities. Relative
loss-aversion may further promote the persistence of
IEO (Breen & Goldthorpe, 1997): according to this
view, all social groups share the same fundamental ob-
jective, avoiding social demotion for their children,
but this objective has different implications for dif-
ferent social groups, because their children start the
social competition from different social positions.
Hence, investing in university education is a core pri-
ority for upper class families in order to minimise the
risks of social demotion for their children, while vo-
cational pathways in secondary and tertiary education
may be a safer strategy for short-range upward mobil-
ity for lower social groups. Overall, social reproduc-
tion theories argue that the upper classes have the
cultural and economic resources, as well as the moti-
vations, to preserve a competitive edge in education,
even in a context of mass education. 
The hypothesis of ‘maximally maintained inequal-
ity’ introduces some nuance within social reproduc-
tion theories (Raftery & Hout, 1993): when educa-
tion expands at a given educational level, IEO may be
reduced if the upper classes have already reached sat-
uration at this level, but these classes will react by in-
tensifying their investments at higher levels, so that
IEO increases at higher levels. The hypothesis of ‘ef-
fectively maintained inequality’ further suggests that
the upper classes have the resources and motivations
to exploit horizontal differences within educational
levels to their advantage: for instance, they can pre-
serve a competitive edge in the educational arena even
in a context of mass higher education by monopolis-
ing access to the most prestigious high schools and
universities, to the more rewarding fields of study, to
postgraduate programs (van de Werfhorst, 2002;
Lucas & Byrne, 2017).  
Overall, social reproduction theories pose two fun-
damental critiques to modernisation theories. First,
while capitalist societies promote growing affluence,
they are still marked by strong inequalities of condi-
tion, which foster the persistence of inequalities of op-
portunity. Hence, the claim that inequalities of
condition are legitimate in meritocratic societies
would be naif, given that the former actually hinders
equal opportunities in education.  Second, it seems
unrealistic to assume, as modernisation theories do,
that the upper classes will passively accept the erosion
of their privilege: instead they can be expected to mo-
bilise their superior material and immaterial resources
to preserve their competitive advantage, even in con-
texts of mass educational expansion. Hence, IEO can
be expected to remain stable or display only trendless
fluctuations. 
2. The empirical evidence challenges
both theories 
The thesis of persistent inequality in education has
dominated the debate in the 1980s and 1990s, while
over the past 20 years the balance of empirical evi-
dence has shifted in favour of the hypothesis of de-
clining IEO. Evidence in this direction is now well
established for Germany (Jonsson et al., 1996; Mayer
et al., 2007; Blossfeld et al., 2015), France (Vallet,
2014; Falcon & Bataille, 2018), Italy (Shavit & 
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Westerbeek, 1998; Ballarino et al., 2009; Barone et
al., 2010; Triventi et al., 2015), Spain (Ballarino et al.,
2009), Sweden (Esping-Andersen, 2014; Erikson &
Jonsson, 1996) and other Scandinavian countries
(Kivinen & Rinne, 1996; Esping-Andersen, 2014),
the US (Bernardi et al., 2018; Hertel & Pfeffer, 2016).
The work by Breen et al. (2009, 2010) marks a turn-
ing point in this debate, as they report evidence of de-
clining IEO for six out of eight European countries
under examination (Great Britain and Poland being
the exceptions). Their results have been recently repli-
cated and extended by Barone and Ruggera (2016),
who report declining IEO in 24 out of 26 European
countries. According to these comparative studies, the
decline of IEO is not negligible in magnitude and in-
volves both males and females to a similar extent. 
These results are robust to several methodological
specifications (Breen et al., 2010, Barone & Ruggera,
2016). First, measuring social origins with reference
to parental social class only, parental education only,
or both, does not affect the main results (and the dis-
tinction between social class and social status measures
is equally unimportant). Bukodi and Goldthorpe
(2012; Bukodi et al., 2014) have recently advocated
in favour of a more comprehensive measurement of
social background, which involves simultaneously fit-
ting measures of parental social class, education and
social status, but also recent analyses based on this
more comprehensive approach reporting declining
IEO for most countries (Barone & Ruggera, 2016).
Second, the statistical model used to analyse trends
over time (Mare’s educational transition model, multi-
nomial or ordered logit) is equally ininfluent. Third,
using relative or absolute measures of inequality in ed-
ucational attainment (such as the odds ratio and the
logits vs. probability differences or marginal effects),
does not matter either. Fourth, equalisation involves
not only primary and lower secondary education, but
also upper secondary education, and it is important
to bear in mind that in the 1950s and 1960s the at-
tainment of high school diplomas was far from uni-
versal: these diplomas were highly valued credentials
in the labour market. Finally, equalisation in the post-
war decades has been found to also involve higher ed-
ucation for several countries (Breen et al., 2010,
Barone & Ruggera, 2016). Hence, we cannot easily
dismiss these changes by claiming that the upper
classes preserved stable advantages at higher educa-
tional levels, as suggested by social reproduction the-
ories. Overall, these results also reject the hypothesis
of effectively maintainted inequality and, more gen-
erally, the claim that IEO is persistent when we con-
sider the positional value of education (Shavit & Park,
2016; Shavit et al., 2007).    
So why did earlier studies fail to detect the decline
in IEO? The single most important reason is that they
did not have enough statistical power, that is, their
sample sizes were too small to detect the declines of
IEO. The unfortunate consequences of this limita-
tion, which involves also more recent studies (such as
Pfeffer, 2008, Herz et al., 2009, Bukodi &
Goldthorpe, 2012) have been extensively illustrated
elsewhere (Breen et al., 2009; Barone & Ruggera,
2016). Therefore, I will not elaborate on this point.
Modernisation theory thus has a point but it does
not encapsulate the full picture. The problem is that
the above-reported evidence of declining IEO con-
cerns cohorts born in the 1940s and 1950s, that is,
the cohorts schooled in a period of dramatic eco-
nomic growth, the so-called Trente Glorieuses (1945-
1973). On the contrary, for cohorts schooled in the
two following decades, we now have increasing evi-
dence of stable IEO (Barone & Ruggera, 2016; Mer-
aviglia & Buis, 2015; Triventi, 2010; Breen et al.,
2009; Bernardi et al., 2018; Hout & Janus, 2011; Wi-
borg, 2019). In sum, at least four large-scale analyses
converge in reporting that IEO declined for the birth
cohorts schooled during the economic boom of the
postwar decades, while it stagnated (or declined very
slowly) thereafter. Altogether, these results challenge
the prediction that economic modernisation translates
into a monotonic, long-term trend of declining IEO.
The thesis of persistent inequality is more accurate for
more recent cohorts.
The results of these macro-comparative analyses
should not be taken at surface value. In some coun-
tries, we may observe some mild, continuing decline
of IEO in recent cohorts, while a few countries may
have experienced little change even in the post-war
decades. However, the broad picture is sufficiently
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clear: equalisation is the dominant trend during the
Trente Glorieuses, while persistence of IEO is the norm
later on. Unsuriprisingly, a forthcoming comparative
study on social mobility reports that the relationship
between origins and occupational destinations de-
clined in the post-war decades parallel to declining
IEO, and largely stagnated thereafter (Breen &
Mueller, 2019).
However, these long-term, comparative analyses
consider only the level of education attained, or they
incorporate at best only the distinction between aca-
demic and vocational programmes in secondary and
tertiary education. Hence, these studies most often
fail to consider the vertical differences between bach-
elor and master degrees, as well as the horizontal dif-
ferences between fields of study and between
university institutions with different prestige (hypoth-
esis of effectively maintained inequality). This is a
major limitation, particularly for the more recent
decades, while in the post-war decades, these internal
differences within higher education did not exist or
were much less visible and significant: in a context
where undifferentiated, unitary models of higher ed-
ucation prevailed, and where a clear hierarchy be-
tween universities existed only in few countries such
as the US and the UK, the main division within
Higher Education involved fields of study. Even this
division was probably less significant than it is nowa-
days, given that tertiary attainment rates were much
lower than the share of upper class positions in west-
ern countries (Breen & Mueller, 2019), which means
that the chances of graduates from weak fields access-
ing upper class jobs were more favourable. All in all,
the conclusion that IEO has declined in the post-war
decades seems unlikely to be undermined by empiri-
cal evidence involving finer distinctions on higher ed-
ucation. However, with the massive expansion of
higher education in recent decades, these differences
have become more important, and the upper classes
may be able to effectively exploit them to their advan-
tage (Triventi, 2013; Ichou & Vallet, 2011). This line
of argument gives one more reason to suspect that
IEO, when assessed comprehensively in its full vertical
and horizontal dimensions, has been stagnating, or
perhaps even increasing, in recent decades, in contrast
to the predictions of modernisation theory.  
In sum, social reproduction theory is undermined
by the robust evidence indicating a substantial, gen-
eralised decline of IEO in the post-war decades, while
modernisation theory is challenged by the generalised
stagnation of IEO in recent decades. The current em-
pirical evidence does not match either of these theo-
retical approaches. However, I will argue in the next
section that the pattern of declining and then stagnat-
ing IEO is far from surprising or unexpected, in light
of the structural and institutional transformations ex-
perienced by western societies in recent decades
(Bernardi et al., 2018). 
3.1 Tertium datur: micro- and macro-
level determinants of educational 
inequality 
In order to outline a theoretical framework for the
analysis of trends in IEO, we must proceed in three
steps. First, we need a simple micro-level model of ed-
ucational choices. For the purpose of this discussion,
I will simply assume that the educational decisions of
families are responsive to three parameters: the costs
of educational investments, their socio-economic
profitability and the student’s academic performance.
There is indeed a large amount of empirical evidence
supporting this assumption, which is consistent with
several specific models of bounded rationality (Erik-
son & Jonsson, 1996; Gambett, 1996; Goldthorpe,
2000). 
The second step is to identify the macro-level fac-
tors that have a substantial impact on at least one of
these three choice parameters. We do not want to con-
sider all possible determinants of IEO. If we are to ac-
count for some broad, large-scale trends, such as the
overall decline of IEO in the post-war decades and its
more recent stagnation, we must ignore country-spe-
cific, idiosyncratic factors and focus instead on those
determinants of IEO operating across a wide range of
western countries.  To understand the broad picture,
we must select macro-level determinants of IEO op-
erating with a sufficient level of generalisability. Fur-
thermore, we restrict our discussion to determinants
of IEO for which there is a clear theoretical rationale
Carlo Barone 
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and sufficiently robust empirical evidence that they
impact IEO across western countries. 
The economic resources available to families to meet
the costs of educational participation are expected to af-
fect IEO. Economists most often refer narrowly to
family income and wealth, while sociologists take a
broader view, stressing the role of employment stabil-
ity (Godlthorpe, 2000), particularly when long-term
educational investments are involved (for instance,
taking the academic track in secondary education to
attend university in the future). Family size, and par-
ticularly the number of children in the schooling age
range, also affects educational decisions, because of
the dilution of economic resources available for edu-
cational investments (De Haan, 2012). We must con-
sider direct costs, which involve the fees at each level
of education, the indirect costs of transportation and
study materials, as well as opportunity costs, particu-
larly relevant at lower educational transitions in older
cohorts, where child labour was widespread (Erikson
& Jonsson, 1996; Huebner, 2012).  
Regarding student performance, the main consid-
eration is that the earlier, more intensive and more
prolonged exposure of children to a shared learning
environment reduces the role of the cultural resources of
the family (Erikson & Jonsson, 1996; Esping-Ander-
sen, 2015; Heckman, 2011). Cultural resources reflect
the concentration of high or low levels of education
within households, as well as the active mobilisation
of these resources via parental investments in formal
and informal learning activities. These unequal re-
sources play a larger role if students spend more time
with the parents, or with children having access to
similar socio-economic resources, while exposing all
children more intensively and for a longer period to a
shared learning environment has the opposite effect.
This explains why early child care provision, the
length of compulsory schooling, as well as formal and
informal tracking, have been found to impact in-
equalities in student performance and participation
(Braga et al., 2013; Blossfeld et al., 2016, 2017; Lowe
et al., 2010; Pfeffer, 2008).  
Finally, the magnitude of returns to education in
terms of employment prospects and earnings is a third
major important determinant of educational invest-
ments. The uncertainty surrounding these returns is
no less important (De Groot & Osterbeek, 1992). As
argued above on the basis of loss-aversion models
(Breen & Goldthorpe, 1997), the upper classes have
a strong motivation to reach the highest levels of the
educational system to preserve their social positions,
while the propensity of the lower classes to undertake
ambitious educational investments is likely to be more
affected by their degree of confidence in the actual
profitability of these investments. In particular, in a
context where the share of tertiary qualifications is
low relative to the share of upper class jobs, and where
these credentials ensure high occupational prospects
regardless of the specific field of study or university
institution attended, the motivation of lower socioe-
conomic groups to invest in education is higher than
in contexts of high uncertainty and variability in the
returns to education. 
We are now ready to move to the third step of our
analysis where we consider how these macro-level fac-
tors affecting IEO have evolved from the pre-war to
the post-war decades, and then in more recent
decades, in order to analyse how these changes may
have impacted on trends in IEO.       
3.2 Tertium datur: explaining trends in
educational inequality 
A major consequence of the growing interest amongst
sociologists and economists into long-term trends in
social inequalities is that we are increasingly recognis-
ing the exceptionality of the postwar decades vis-à-vis
the first four and the last three decades of the 20th
century. Not only has the concentration of income
and wealth decreased substantially in the Trente 
Glorieuses (Piketty, 2014; Atkinson, 2016), but the
living conditions of the population, particularly of the
most disadvantaged social groups, displayed unprece-
dented improvements with regard to health, nutrition
and child labour (Chaudry et al., 2016 ; Rosés &
Wolf, 2018; Hicks & Allen, 1999; Erikson & Jons-
son, 1996; Deaton, 2013). The risk of growing up in 
family contexts characterised by extreme material 
deprivation diminished substantially. Moreover, in 
a macroeconomic context approaching full employ-
Towards an Education-based Meritocracy? 
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ment and where permanent labour contracts became
the standard (Crouch, 1999), the increased economic
stability of working class families made more ambi-
tious educational investments increasingly feasible.
The opportunity costs of sending children to school,
rather than employing them in agricultural or indus-
trial work, decreased dramatically, both as a result of
the decline of farming and of reforms raising compul-
sory education age. 
Moreover, in several countries the rapid economic
growth and growing tax revenue sustained substantial
increase in public investment in education and in the
welfare state, which arguably contributed to further
weaken economic hurdles to educational participation
(Braga et al., 2013; Garrouste, 2010; Breen et al.,
2009). The distribution of schools and universities in
the territory became much more capillar, thus sub-
stantially reducing transportation costs. Educational
reforms in this period raised compulsory schooling
age and promoted comprehensive reforms in primary
and secondary education in virtually all western coun-
tries.  Altoghether, when comparing the post- and
pre-war decades, we observe a marked convergence of
macro-level factors promoting a reduction of the eco-
nomic barriers fuelling IEO.  
The economic crisis of 1973-1974 can be taken as
reference point for the start of a new period where
most of the structural and institutional conditions
promoting educational equalisation faded out, while
some new conditions may actually cause an increase
in IEO (Bernardi et al., 2018). First, the alternating
between periods of slow economic growth and reces-
sions was accompanied by rising unemployment rates
and rising employment precarity (Standing, 2009),
which was reinforced by the deregulation of labour
markets taking place in several western countries since
the 1980s or 1990s (Crouch, 1999; Esping-Andersen
& Regini, 2000). In a context of welfare retrenche-
ment, where the coverage and the generosity of un-
employment benefits and of minimum income
guarantees were reduced (Cantillon et al., 2015; Fer-
ragina et al., 2013), these economic trends under-
mined the economic security of the less well-off. 
At the same time, some factors that probably
played a role for educational equalisation in the earlier
period, such as the construction of a capillar network
of schools within the national territory and improve-
ments in transportation are likely to have exhausted,
or at least significantly reduced, their equalising po-
tential in recent decades, to the extent that the acces-
sibility of schools is no longer a significant barrier to
educational participation since several decades ago.
Finally, it is well-documented that income and wealth
inequalities have displayed significant increases in
most western countries since the 1980s or 1990s
(Atkinson, 2016; Piketty, 2014).  Altogether, these
trends suggest that the decline of economic hurdles
to educational participation that characterised the
Trente Glorieuses has come to an halt in more recent
years.  
At the same time, the pace of structural change in
the employment structure has been slower than edu-
cational expansion in recent decades. Tertiary attain-
ment rates have increased much more rapidly than the
share of upper class positions in the labour market in
western countries (Breen & Mueller, 2019; Bernardi
& Ballarino, 2016; Hirsch, 1972). Even if relative re-
turns to education are stable or decline only margin-
ally (Breen, 2004; Breen & Mueller, 2018), the
motivation to undertake ambitious educational in-
vestments has been undermined by the growing un-
certainty surrounding their returns (Chauvel, 2015).
As argued above, this factor is likely to have a negative
impact on the educational strategies of working class
families, in a context where opportunities for upward
social mobility are compressed by the stagnation of
occupational upgrading.
As for the educational system, selectivity in pri-
mary and secondary education has continued to de-
cline in recent decades, to the extent that the
attainment of some upper secondary educational
qualification is today almost regarded as a citizenship
right that is quasi-universalistic (Eurydice, 2012;
Downes, 2014; OECD, 2017). Grade repetition and
selective exams in primary and middle schools have
continued to decline and success rates at upper sec-
ondary examinations have increased in several coun-
tries (ibidem). In some countries, the barriers between
academic and vocational tracks have been reduced in
recent decades by postponing tracking age, creating
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intermediate tracks or reducing the curricular differ-
ences among them (Blossfeld et al., 2016). At the
same time, recent tendencies towards growing decen-
tralisation and accountability of the school system are
promoting the emergence of new forms of socially-
biased informal differentiation between schools, relat-
ing to their student composition by social background
and academic performance, as well as to the quality
of their educational resources and their position in na-
tional rankings: the evidence indicates that upper class
families are more responsive to these ‘quality’ factors
(Owen, 2016). The increased residential segregation
by socio-economic status observed in Europe and the
US (Tammaru et al., 2016; Owen, 2016) is yet an-
other force promoting an increasing informal differ-
entiation of learning environments. Finally, the
declining selectivity in primary and secondary educa-
tion has been countervailed by the growing barriers
for access to higher education (Ruegg, 2011; Dowes,
2014): access restrictions (numerus clausus, entry ex-
aminations, grade requirements) are increasingly com-
mon in western higher education systems and
negatively impact the IEO (Braga et al., 2013). 
The only generalised, countervailing trend which
could have promoted a reduction of IEO in recent
decades is the growing accessibility of public child care
and pre-school education (Blossfeld et al., 2017). The
expansion of the regulation and professionalisation of
child care provision suggests also that the quality of
preschool education may have positively evolved over
time from a predominant focus on promoting female
labour market participation to stronger concerns for
the quality of the educational activities. However, at
the same time, parental time investments in early
childhood have grown unequal. There is evidence that
the overall time spent by parents with their children
has increased since the 1970s, but to a higher rate for
highly-educated parents (Dotti Sani & Treas, 2016).
This conclusion refers also to time specifically spent
in informal educational activities at home (ibid.), such
as shared book reading, which play an important role
in fostering a child’s cognitive development in the pre-
school years. Moreover, over the last three decades of
the 20th century, women have closed the gender gap
in education. In a context where the distribution of
education is similar for men and women and relative
educational homogamy does not substantially de-
crease (Smits et al., 2000; Katmak et al., 2006;
Bouchet-Valat, 2011), the structural opportunities for
absolute educational homogamy increase (Di Prete &
Buchmann, 2013). This means that the concentration
of high (low) levels of education, and thus of high
(low) levels of educational resources, within the same
household have increased over time. 
Overall, the trend of declining IEO detected for
the postwar decades has probably diminished  in re-
cent decades, due to the concomitant action of five
factors: a) the increased social gradients in parental re-
sources and investments in children’s early skill devel-
opment; b) growing economic and occupational
inequalities; c) the emergence of new mechanisms of
informal differentiation of the educational supply; d)
the increased uncertainy surrounding investments in
higher education as an avenue to social mobility; e)
the growing horizontal differentiation of higher edu-
cation. 
4. Concluding remarks
The educational equalisation in the postwar decades
is an important finding because it shows that IEO can
be reduced, and that this is true not only under the ex-
ceptional circumstances characterising a few, small,
egalitarian Scandinavian countries. Indeed, if a large-
scale reduction of IEO was not observed in this period
of extraordinary improvements of the material con-
ditions of the working classes and of progressive edu-
cational and welfare state reforms, we should probably
conclude that trying to equalise education and social
mobility opportunities is a hopeless effort in capitalist
societies. This conclusion has some ideological appeal
for those scholars who persistently discard the evi-
dence contradicting the persistent inequality thesis,
but this pessimistic message would be also the best
justification that research could provide to policy-
makers for disregarding IEO.  
At the same time, I have argued that the forces
promoting educational equalisation have largely
diminshed in recent decades. The main direction of
several recent socio-economic trends and of 
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educational, labour market and welfare policies is
rather to promote a stagnation or an increase of edu-
cational inequalities in younger cohorts. This increase
is indeed visible in the US (Bernardi et al., 2018), a
country where many of these trends have started ear-
lier and have proceeded at a more rapid pace, and it
may become soon apparent in European countries. At
the same time, I have argued in the previous section
that not all factors promoting a reduction of IEO have
entirely disappeared in recent decades, and it is diffi-
cult to predict the ‘net effect’ of countervailing influ-
ences. For cohorts born between 1965 and 1980 and
schooled between the 1970s and the 2000s, the em-
pirical evidence discussed in section 2 points to stable
IEO for most European countries. However, if the
structural and institutional developments outlined in
the previous section continue in the near future, we
must expect a growth of IEO for the cohorts born in
the 1980s and 1990s (where it will be particularly im-
portant to measure IEO by fully taking into account
the internal differentiation of higher education).   
This pattern of declining and then stagnating IEO
fits the predictions of neither of the two dominant
theoretical paradigms in social mobility research. The
trendless fluctuations hypothesis is clearly problem-
atic, because in virtually all western countries the cur-
rent levels of IEO are lower than those observed in
the pre-war decades. The modernisation hypothesis,
on the other hand, fails to explain three decades of
stagnating IEO: the thesis that economic develop-
ment is conducive to an education-based meritocracy
today appears little more than wishful thinking. In-
deed these two families of theories are more similar
than they may appear at first glance, as they share the
same linear view of the evolution of IEO, conceived
either as a downward or as an horizontal line, thus
downplaying the possibility of more discontinuous
evolutions. 
In turn, these limitations have important substan-
tive and policy implications. If the persistent inequal-
ity thesis is wrong in suggesting that IEO cannot be
reduced, modernisation theory is too simplistic in
suggesting that economic growth and socio-economic
modernisation are sufficient to reduce IEO. It is
worth keeping in mind that the pace of modernisa-
tion processes has been rather high in several western
countries in the past four decades, and that in this pe-
riod some of these countries have experienced a sus-
tained economic growth, while failing to reduce IEO.  
Hence, the interpretation that I have proposed
suggests that the relationship between economic
growth and IEO is less mechanic than assumed by
modernisation theory because it is strongly mediated
by institutional variables. In the post-war decades,
economic development led to a reduction of IEO be-
cause it was accompanied by a changing balance of
power between social classes that favoured progressive
reforms in educational, labour market and welfare in-
stitutions. However, when the same modernisation
processes have been associated with a weakening of
the political representation and influence of the work-
ing classes, the resulting economic and occupational
inequalities, coupled with the recent neo-liberal re-
forms of educational and welfare institutions, have
halted the trend of declining IEO. In addition to poli-
cies, politics also matter in the reduction and en-
hancement of social inequality.
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